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Decisions rendered in Succession of Butler' by the Louisiana
supreme court, and in Guilbeau v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co.I by
the Third Circuit Court of Appeal involved disputes concerning law-
yers' contingent fee contracts. Butler held that a contingent fee based
on community assets recovered in a suit for separation from bed and
board is contrary to public policy. Guilbeau held that under a contin-
gent fee contract written pursuant to Louisiana R.S. 37:2181 the client
has the absolute right to discharge the attorney, with or without
cause, and in the case of discharge for cause the attorney loses the
protection of the statute and is entitled only to quantum meruit. Both
cases raise questions with respect to current fee practices among the
Louisiana bar and indicate a continuing trend among courts to
closely scrutinize lawyers' fees.
The subject of contingent fees first confronted the Louisiana
courts in 1812 and has received inconsistent treatment to the present.
The cases often distinguish between fee contracts which give a pres-
ent interest in the subject matter of the litigation and those which
merely grant the attorney a contingent fee measured by a percentage
of the amount recovered. The earliest case, Livingston v. Cornell,4
held that even a contingent fee measured by a percentage of the
amount recovered is unlawful, citing primarily European authority.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 294 So. 2d 512 (La. 1974).
2. 293 So. 2d 216 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
3. LA. R.S. 37:218 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1970, No. 595, provides: "By
written contracts signed by the client, attorneys at law may acquire as their fee an
interest in the subject matter of the suit, proposed suit, or claim in the prosecution or
defense of which they are employed, whether the suit or claim be for money or for
property. In such a contract for employment, it may be stipulated that neither the
attorney nor the client may, without the written consent of the other, settle, compro-
mise, release, discontinue or otherwise dispose of the suit or claim. Either party to the
contract may, at any time, file it with the clerk of the district court in which the suit
is pending or is to be brought and have an original or certified copy made and served
by registered or certified mail on the opposing party. After such service, any settle-
ment, compromise, discontinuance, or other disposition made of the suit or claim by
either the attorney or the client without the written consent of the other is null and
void and the suit or claim shall be proceeded with as if no such settlement or discontin-
uance had been made."
4. 2 Mart.(O.S.) 281 (La. 1812).
5. Even today contingent fee contracts are prohibited by law in England and
France. This includes fee arrangements measured by a percentage of the amount
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In that decision the Louisiana supreme court discussed an act of the
territorial legislature of 1808 which declared null and void any attor-
ney's "bargain or agreement, with a plaintiff or defendant, depending
on the event of any suit, to receive any portion or part of the land, or
any other property that may be in dispute, or sued for, as a compen-
sation of [his] services."' Stating that the act of 1808 did nothing
more than declare that which was already the law, the court went on
to say that in its opinion money is "property" as used in the act,
"[miost men considering money as the best kind of property."7 In
1834 the court deviated from this ruling and declared that although
attorneys were forbidden to stipulate for a part of the thing in contro-
versy, "they are not inhibited from stipulating for a certain commis-
sion on collections to be made by them."' In 1855 the legislature
repealed the act of 18081 and in 1880 the court again recognized the
legality of contingent fee arrangements."0 This development was con-
sistent with developments in other states."
Although the court during this period came to accept contingent
fees measured by a percentage of the recovery, it does not appear that
it ever sanctioned an attorney's taking a present interest in the sub-
ject matter as his fee. Louisiana Civil Code article 244712 prohibited
the purchase of litigious rights by advocates and attorneys, and the
rules of mandate and agency prohibited the attorney from having an
interest conflicting with that of his client. 3 In 1906, however, the
legislature passed an act amending the attorney's privilege section of
the Louisiana Revised Statutes 4 to provide that under certain condi-
recovered as well as those granting a present interest in the subject matter of litigation.
See DALLOZ, NOUVEAU REPERTOIRE DE DROIT Avocat n* 90 (2d ed. 1962); Youngwood,
The Contingent Fee-A Reasonable Alternative?, 28 MODERN L. REV. 330 (1965); Note,
41 CORNELL L.Q. 683 (1956).
6. La. Acts 1808, Ch. 30, §4.
7. 2 Mart.(O.S.) 281, 290 (La. 1812).
8. Flower v. O'Conner, 7 La. 198, 207 (1834).
9. La. Acts 1855, No. 115, §12.
10. Martinez v. Succession of Vives, 32 La. Ann. 305 (1880); but see Mazureau &
Hennen v. Morgan, 25 La. Ann. 281 (1873). See also Andirac v. Richardson, 125 La.
883, 51 So. 1024 (1910).
11. See F. MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES (1964); LA. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 2-20 (found in ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION, LOUISIANA
STATE BAR ASS'N art. XVI; LA. R.S. 37, ch. 4; app.) [hereinafter cited as CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY].
12. See La. CiV. Code art. 2422 (1825). See also McClung v. Atlas Oil Co., 148
La. 674, 87 So. 515 (1921); D'Albora v. Roussel, 182 So. 2d 124 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966);
Comment, 1 LA. L. RED. 593 (1939).
13. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3003; McMichael v. Davidson, 7 Rob. 53 (La. 1844).
14. LA. R.S. § 2897 (1870), as amended by La. Acts 1906, No. 124.
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tions attorneys may acquire as their fee "an interest in the subject
matter" of the suit, proposed suit or claim, whether for money or
property. This legislation exists today as R.S. 37:218 and is the sub-
ject of the Guilbeau decision. Guilbeau raises issues of the right of a
client to discharge his attorney and the meaning of an "interest in
the subject matter" of a suit or claim.
The modern cases indicate that 37:218 permits an attorney to
take a present interest in the suit or claim, but the decisions are
unclear as to whether the mere granting of a "contingent fee" or a
fee based on a percentage of the amount recovered under a contract
purporting to comply with the statute bestows a sufficient interest in
the subject matter to bring the attorney under the statute.'5 The
better opinion is that a contract granting the attorney a "contingent
fee" and nothing more does not create an "interest in the subject
matter" within the meaning of 37:218.16 Futhermore, there is an
increasing tendency among the courts of appeal to treat the interest
protected by the statute as being in the nature of a lien rather than
as a vested interest.17
In Guilbeau an attorney sought to recover his percentage fee from
a client who retained him for representation in a personal injury
claim but who subsequently discharged him and retained other coun-
sel. The second attorney successfUlly negotiated a settlement, and
the court found that the client had good cause to discharge the first
attorney. The court assumed that the contract with the first attorney
granted an interest sufficient to bring 37:218 into operation, and de-
scribed it as a "contingent legal retainer."'" The statute provides that
the contract may stipulate that "neither the attorney nor the client
may, without the written consent of the other, settle, compromise,
release, discontinue or otherwise dispose of the suit or claim,"" and
15. See Stiles v. Bruton 134 La. 523, 64 So. 399 (1914); Succession of Carbajal,
139 La. 481, 71 So. 774 (1916); Succession of Rice, 147 La. 834, 86 So. 282 (1920); Hope
v. Madison, 194 La. 337, 193 So. 666 (1940); Robinson v. Hunt, 211 La. 1019, 31 So.
2d 197 (1946); Tennant v. Russell, 214 La. 1046, 39 So. 2d 726 (1949); Acadian Prod.
Corp. v. Savanna Corp., 226 La. 849, 77 So. 2d 417 (1954); Succession of Vlaho, 140
So. 2d 226 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); Palmer & Palmer v. Stire, 195 So. 2d 706 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1967). See also Deshotels v. United States, 450 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1972).
16. See Tennant v. Russell, 214 La. 1046, 39 So. 2d 726 (1949); Louque v. Dejan,
129 La. 519, 56 So. 427 (1911); Succession of Carbajal, 139 La. 481, 71 So. 774 (1916).
See also CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RZsPONSIBILrry DR 5-103.
17. See Sanders v. Rowan Drilling Co., 247 So. 2d 665 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971);
Palmer & Palmer v. Stire, 195 So. 2d 706 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); Succession of Vlaho,
140 So. 2d 226 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962).
18. Guilbeau v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 293 So. 2d 216, 217 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1974).
19. LA. R.S. 37:218 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1970, No. 595, §1.
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it is assumed that the contract in Guilbeau so provided. The court
held that in spite of such a clause, the client has the absolute right
to terminate the attorney-client relationship, 0 with or without cause,
and in the case of discharge for cause the attorney loses whatever
rights he might have under 37:218. Therefore the client was free to
settle the case without the consent of the attorney, and the attorney
lost his. right to the contractual fee.
The court apparently assumed that the contract between the
first attorney and client was no longer in force because it made no
mention of the necessity of dissolving it. This is consistent with the
attitude that 37:218 grants protection to the attorney only in the
nature of a lien. In previous cases, however, where the client expressly
granted a present ownership interest in specific property, the courts
were more inclined to treat the attorney's interest as in full owner-
ship.2 Regardless of whether the attorney's interest is considered as
a lien or a present interest, it appears that even under the present
interest contract the client has the absolute right to discharge the
attorney, with or without cause, and in the event of discharge for
cause, the client is entitled to have the contract dissolved in an action
for rescission. With respect to the attorney's rights in the case of
discharge for no cause, however, confusion still abounds.
It appears that it is now time for the legislature to repeal 37:218.
Although there is merit in permitting an attorney to receive an inter-
est in property as his fee after the matter has been completed (as in
the case of a petitory action for land), there is little or no merit in
permitting the transfer of a present interest in anything, whether it
be land or a personal injury claim. The conflict of interest created by
such an interest offends not only traditional rules of law, but also
basic rules of due process.
Succession of Butler" presents another aspect of contingent fee
contracts. The Louisiana supreme court held that a contingent fee
based on community assets recovered in a suit for separation from
bed and board is contrary to public policy. It cited as authority dic-
20. See Louque v. Dejan, 129 La. 519, 56 So. 427 (1911); Marchand v. Gulf Ref.
Co., 187 La. 1002, 175 So. 647 (1937); Gravity Drainage Dist. No. 2 v. Edwards, 207
La. 1, 20 So. 2d 405 (1944); Kramer v. Graham, 272 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
See also Opinion No. 320 of the Committee on Professional Responsibility (1968) in
LOUISIANA STATE BAR Ass'N AVrORNEY'S DESK BooK.
21. See Stiles v. Bruton, 134 La. 523, 64 So. 399 (1914); United Gas Pub. Serv.
Co. v. Christian, 186 La. 689, 173 So. 174 (1937); Hope v. Madison, 194 La. 337, 193
So. 666 (1940); Robinson v. Hunt, 211 La. 1019, 31 So. 2d 197 (1946); Acadian Prod.
Corp. v. Savanna Corp., 226 La. 849, 77 So. 2d 417 (1954).
22. 294 So. 2d 512 (La. 1974). Butler was followed in Aucoin v. Williams, 291 So.
2d 504 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
tum from an early Louisiana appellate decisionn and the general rule
in most jurisdictions. It is the first time the issue has been decided
in Louisiana, and it is quite consistent with the standards suggested
by the Code of Professional Responsibility.2 4 The court stated that
every attempt should be made to reconcile estranged couples, and
that any fee arrangement with an attorney which is in derogation of
the marriage relation is for that reason void. Although the decision
does not raise the question, if it were decided that other family rela-
tionships are equally as important as the marriage relationship, ap-
plication of the logic of the Butter decision should result in the nullity
of contingent fee contracts in will contests and contested succession
proceedings as well. Although such a decision is unlikely, the logic
might be more readily accepted in the case where the attorney at-
tempts to protect his contingent fee pursuant to R.S. 37:218.25
23. See McMahon v. Hardin, 10 La. App. 416, 121 So. 678 (La. App. Orl. Cir.
1929).
24. See CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20.
25. Note that the contract in Butler provided for a contingent fee and also at-
tempted to limit the client's right to settle or compromise without the attorney's
consent.
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